Iranian Plan to Instigate Civil War in Lebanon Takes Bold First Step
Analysis. By Gregory R. Copley, Editor, GIS, and Yossef Bodansky, Senior Editor, GIS.
The assassination on November 21, 2006, of Lebanese anti-Syrian Maronite Christian Phalangist politician — Industry Minister Pierre Gemayel, 34, and his driver, Samir Shartuni — and the attempted murder of another anti-Syrian politician, State Minister for Parliamentary Affairs Michel Pharaon, were the first steps designed by the Iranian Government to trigger a full-scale civil war in Lebanon.
There were clear indicators that the assassination was ordered by the Syrian Government, significantly on the day that the Iraqi Government of Prime Minister Nouri Maliki signed an accord with the Syrian Government to resume diplomatic relations between Iraq and Syria after a 26-year break, and only days before the planned visit by Iraqi Pres. Jalal Talabani was due to travel to Iran on Saturday, November 25, 2006, as part of an Iranian initiative — with Syria — to ensure that any regional initiatives would be undertaken without the participation of the United States.
The message of the assassination of Pierre Gemayel, and the attempted assassination of Michel Pharaon, could not have been more clear. Moreover, the Lebanese Government of Prime Minister Fouad Siniora had already been depleted by the resignation of six pro-Syrian ministers, and with Gemayel's death, the resignation or death of two more ministers would bring down the Government.
The November 21, 2006, assassination and attempted assassination were the latest provocations in a 10-day political crisis originally instigated by the HizbAllah once Tehran feared that the traditional political forces in Lebanon were coalescing to prevent the political ascent of the HizbAllah.
By late October 2006, Lebanon’s leading politicians and political commentators were warning that the growing power of the HizbAllah amounted to the turning of Lebanon into an Iranian protectorate.
Writing in the 26 October issue of An-Nahar, leading journalist Ali Hamadeh urged his countrymen to act “before Lebanon turns into one big prison under the watch of the Lebanese Revolutionary Guards”. Several authors in the Lebanese and London-based all-Arab media warned that the HizbAllah was planning a military coup since it had been unable to bring about political changes via democratic means.
On November 11, 2006, HizbAllah exploited a government impasse over its demands for veto-power to order all five Shi’ite pro-Syrian ministers (two HizbAllah, two Amal, one independent) resign in protest. The Shi’ite leadership vowed to ensure that the Shi’a majority would rule Lebanon.
“To pave the way for the majority to practice what it wants freely and so that we don’t cover what we are not convinced of ... we announce the resignation of our representatives in the current cabinet,” said a joint statement by HizbAllah and Amal regarding the ministers’ resignations. Concurrently, mobs started forming in the streets of Shi’ite southern Beirut demanding “justice”.
The next day, HizbAllah deputy chief Sheikh Naim Kassem declared that HizbAllah intended to “take the streets in Lebanon” as the “first step” in a campaign aimed “to salvage the country from this mentality [of traditional Christian-Sunni power structure].”
Meanwhile, the Sunni "al-Qaida Lebanon" threatened to destroy the Fouad Siniora Government because it was corrupt and took orders from the US Administration. Pro-Syrian Lebanese Pres. Emile Lahoud aggravated the crisis by interceding on behalf of the HizbAllah and al-Qaida. He endorsed the ministers’ resignation as signifying the fall of the Siniora Government.
“Any cabinet meeting held by this [Siniora’s] government shall be absolutely illegal and unconstitutional because what is based on illegal grounds shall be considered null and void,” Lahoud said. To demonstrate Lahoud was serious, Environment Minister Yacoub Sarraf, Lahoud’s most loyal ally in the Government, resigned the next day shortly before the cabinet met.
HizbAllah leader Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah assumed leadership of the crisis on November 14, 2006. “This government will go,” he told supporters at a meeting. “We have no links to it after the resignation. There will be a new government” because Siniora's government now had “zero credibility” in the eyes of Lebanon’s Shi’ite majority.
“There will soon be a clean government that will rebuild what the Israeli aggression has destroyed,” Nasrallah predicted. He did not dismiss the threat of the crisis escalating into street violence and even a civil war. “This country is our country, and we have sacrificed tens of thousands of fatalities, casualties, prisoners and mutilated individuals and our most prized possessions to protect it and its honor.
We will not turn our backs on it and will uphold peace between the residents as well as stability.”
Lebanese leaders reacted with fury to Nasrallah’s warnings. “This is a coup; this is a war between religious sects and a war between ethnic groups,” declared Mount Lebanon Mufti, Sheikh Dr Muhammad Ali al-Jozo, a Sunni. He warned that Nasrallah was eyeing the presidency. Druze leader Walid Jumblatt declared: “We will never surrender to HizbAllah” and warned of the gathering clouds of a new civil war.
By now, Damascus was assuming the leadership of the crisis in Beirut. On November 16, 2006, Hassan Haydar warned, in an article in the influential Al-Hayah, about the growing rôle of Damascus:
“Damascus has been summoning Shi’ite, Sunni, and Christian leaderships that enjoyed its assistance during its guardianship over Lebanon, to remind them that the time has come for them to pay the bill and entice them with a foothold in the coming stage. Damascus is the one coordinating the mobilization of the opposition and orchestrating its moves in conjunction with its supreme ally, Iran.”
On November 19, 2006, Nasrallah addressed a massive rally and gave the Siniora Government an ultimatum on how to resolve the crisis. “There are two solutions: either the resignation of the Government or early parliamentary elections,” he declared.
Nasrallah accused the Government of being a puppet off the United States. “We cannot have any confidence in this government because it answers to the decisions and wishes of the American administration," Nasrallah said.
“We will not allow you [the Siniora Government] to continue ruling this country, because you are an American government. ... We want a national unity government in which all political sects take part and block external dictations ... and you will find out that we will not differ with you over primary issues.”
Nasrallah did not expect the crisis to be resolved soon or peacefully. He told his followers to be ready for instructions to take to the streets. “We have to be psychologically prepared to take to the streets because we may send for you [in] 24 hours, or 12 hours, or even six hours,” Nasrallah said.
“There has to be a patriotic opposition in the street; our action is peaceful and civilized.” Nasrallah warned the other political parties not to challenge the Shi’ite mob because this could only provoke riots. “We don’t want riots. We don’t want to clash or confront with the other [anti-Syrian] street,” Nasrallah said amidst chants to the contrary. “We want to respect private and public properties.”
On November 20, 2006, in its main evening news, the HizbAllah’s Al-Manar TV warned about an impending crisis in its opening statement.
“Awaiting the zero hour for the popular move that the Lebanese opposition intends to organize to attain its goal of toppling the Government of the US Ambassador in preparation for establishing a national unity government characterized by serious and actual participation in national decision-making to replace a government that implements a US agenda that stifles the spirit of accord and consultations, the opposition forces began their coordination meetings to lead this peaceful move.
This move will observe the constitutional and legal rules and will take place in various places.”
Al-Manar cited “HizbAllah sources”, explaining that “the time is running short for the ruling team” while “the opposition team is observing the confused reactions of the authority before making another move.”
Al-Manar noted that a negotiated settlement of the brewing crisis was no longer possible because all the proposals which Hizballah had received “include nothing new or anything that might be different from the previous proposals of the authority”.
During the rest of the evening, Al-Manar paraded virtually the entire leadership of the HizbAllah with all of them predicting the impasse to be broken soon and warning of unpredictable violence and civil war if HizbAllah’s “just demands” were not promptly met.
It was now clear that the Syrian Government of Pres. Bashar al-Assad — acting in lock-step with the Iranian Government — now felt confident and ready to instigate a full return to civil war in Lebanon, a move which would trigger direct Iranian involvement and clear the way for Iranian forces to move more openly, with their logistical train, across Iraq following the anticipated Coalition military withdrawal from that country.
A GIS/Defense & Foreign Affairs Daily report of November 9, 2006, entitled The Strategic Ramifications of the US Mid-Term Congressional Elections, noted: “[T]his particular [US] election came at a time of considerable global instability.
This election result will be interpreted as an absolute victory by and for the Iranian clerics, and they will redouble their efforts accordingly. For example, the current Iranian military exercise, Great Prophet 2, which follows on from the long Blow of Zolfaghar exercises, has as a principal premise an Iranian military thrust through the Shi’a areas of Iraq to join up with Syria on the Mediterranean, against Israel and the West.
Moreover, the Iraqi Government will interpret the results as a weakening of US resolve, and will anticipate that insurgent groups (virtually all of whom, knowingly or unknowingly, are supported by Iran) will become more daring. Israel and the entire Middle Eastern region will interpret the results as a weakening of US resolve in the region.”
A Defense & Foreign Affairs Special Analysis report of November 7, 2006, by Yossef Bodansky, and entitled Iranian Military Exercises Continue, Parallel DPRK Exercises, and Highlight Access to Shi’ite Areas of Iraq noted:
The structure and magnitude of the ground force maneuvers starting the night of November 5/6, 2006, simulated a major ground offensive against Israel in cooperation with locally-based terrorists. This phase of the exercise was still ongoing at the time of this report. However, a briefing by Pasdaran Brig.-Gen. Fazli about the launch of the ground offensive phase was significant.
The objective of the offensive was to reach “up to 1,450 kilometers” into enemy territory, first by air strikes and ultimately by ground forces. In the first night, the Pasdaran leading elements infiltrated nearly 300 km, using light vehicles while passing through friendly area [that is, simulating the Shi’ite-populated parts of Iraq].
Meanwhile, the Iranians started deploying élite forces simulating operations into the deep rear of the enemy in coordination with “local troops” [that is, local jihadist forces]. “Some 1,800 self-sufficient teams, Saberin Special Forces, air units and executive teams also gave full logistical support to the [local] troops in surrounding and demolishing the enemy’s forces in the region,” Brig.-Gen. Fazli briefed.
Meanwhile, Lebanese sources were quick, on November 21, 2006, to identify who they felt was the political instrument behind the assassination of Pierre Gemayel and the other attacks.
Chamber of Deputies member Assaad Halim Hardan, 55, a Greek Orthodox politician, and Chief of the Central Political Bureau of the Syrian Social Nationalist Party (SSNP), a Lebanon-based party, was accused by the Lebanese Foundation for Peace of being a key Syrian instrument in the act.
Gunmen had opened fire on Pierre Gemayel’s convoy as it drove through the Christian Sin el-Fil neighborhood of Beirut.
Gemayel was wounded in the attack, but later died of his wounds in hospital. Pierre Gemayel’s uncle, Bashir Gemayel, was killed in September 1982 after he was elected President of Lebanon during Israel’s invasion of the country.
On November 21, 2006, Saad al-Hariri, son of assassinated former Prime Minister Rafik al-Hariri, said: “We believe the hand of Syria is all over the place.”
Significantly, the combination of moves — the assassinations in Beirut, the Iraqi recognition of Syria, and the forthcoming mini-summit in Iran between Iraq, Iran, and Syria — all portend badly for Saudi influence in the region, and a possible, or probable, new civil war in that country would be seen as a major failure of Saudi strategic influence.
Pierre Gemayel’s father and former president, Amin Gemayel, immediately following the assassination resisted the provocation for the Maronite Christians to respond to the attack, and called for restraint from his followers and for prayer.
Clearly, the decision to undertake the highly-symbolic assassinations was made at the highest levels in Tehran and Damascus, but with the intention of causing a violent reaction from the Phalangists and other anti-Syrian elements in Lebanon, without the principal Shi’a ally of Iran, HizbAllah, being seen as having initiated the new civil war.
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